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Introduction
The capital positions of Japanese banks have been under pressure from several factors throughout the 1990s and pressure on banks to raise capital to asset ratios has been cited as a cause of the reduction in aggregate lending in the 1990s. Many observers point speci¯cally to the Basel Accord on risk-based capital which mandated that by March 1993 international banks hold capital of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets 1 .
Fears of a "capital crunch" -a reduction in bank lending in response to stricter regulations on bank capital -brought on by the BIS (Bank of International Settlements) capital adequacy standards¯rst began to surface in Japan in the early 1990s. Bank of Japan o±cials responded to criticism of slow monetary growth rates by pointing to restrictive bank lending policies and faulted pressure to meet capital-adequacy ratios rather than BOJ policy for sluggish growth. 2 The following April, Nissho Iwai Corporation Chairman and future Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami, citing fears of a credit crunch, called for a suspension of BIS capital adequacy requirements. 3 Recent sluggish growth in bank credit and other macroeconomic aggregates has revived interest in the relationship between regulatory capital and lending in Japan.
This study investigates the e®ect of the 1988 Basel Accord on Japanese bank portfolios. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y explains the Basel Accord requirements and how this regulatory shift might in°uence bank managers portfolio decisions. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on the e®ects of risk-based capital-asset ratios on lending and highlights how this study contributes to the debate. Section 4 provides a theoretical framework showing that a change in regulatory regime toward stricter enforcement of capital adequacy requirements will a®ect bank loan growth. Section 5 outlines a strategy for empirically testing the implications of the model and section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 summarizes the¯ndings and concludes.
The Basel Accord of 1988
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, originally comprised of representatives of the central banks and supervisory authorities of the G-10 countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) and Luxembourg, was formed to secure international convergence of supervisory regulations on capital adequacy 4 . The Basel Committee is under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements, but has no formal authority. The agreement is carried out on a voluntary basis by signatory countries, which now number over 100.
Calls to standardize capital adequacy regulations were prompted in large part by the aggressive expansion of Japanese banks in the 1980s. Prior to the Basel Accord, a comparatively lenient regu-1 See, for example The Economist (1992a), The Economist (1992b). 2 Brauchli (1991) 3 Chandler (1992) 4 Wagster (1996) lation requiring all banks to maintain capital of at least 4% of deposits had been enforced in Japan by the Ministry of Finance. There were complaints from the international banking community that this regulatory leniency gave Japanese banks an unfair advantage in gaining market share.
Although the Basel Accord was agreed upon in principle in 1988, banks in Japan were given a 5 year transition period in which to adjust to the new standards before the Accord was written into domestic law and became binding in¯scal year 1992. The agreement requires internationally active banks to maintain a BIS (Bank for International Settlements) ratio of capital to risk weighted assets of at least 8%. Japanese regulators allowed Japanese banks with purely domestic business the option of maintaining a MOF (Ministry of Finance) ratio of capital to assets of at least 4% 5 .
Under the Basel Accord, capital is de¯ned as Tier I or \core" capital and Tier II capital, which is limited to the value of core capital. Core capital consists primarily of shareholders' equity and disclosed reserves, with some adjustments made for consolidated subsidiaries, dividends and bonus payments. Tier II capital includes \near capital", the de¯nition of which is to some extent left up to the domestic regulatory agency. Banks are allowed to count general loan loss reserves (limited to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets), dated subordinated debt 6 and dated preferred stock toward Tier II capital. In Japan, banks are also allowed to count up to 45% of unrealized capital gains 7 , the di®erence between the market value and book value of security holdings, and up to 45% of any land revaluation 8 toward Tier II capital.
On the asset side, there are currently four categories of risk for classifying assets. Risky assets such as loans receive a 100% weighting while safe assets such as government bonds receive a 0% weighting. Secured loans fall in between with a 50% weighting. Table 1 Here Table 1 9 identi¯es the number of banks subject to the 4% MOF and 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio, as well as the number of banks that succeeded in meeting each standard in the years following the signing of the Basel Accord. Domestic banks in Japan are required to maintain at least a 4% MOF capital adequacy ratio, but domestic banks may choose to pursue the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio. Several banks seem to have struggled to meet the 8% or 4% standard in the years between 5 Capital for the MOF ratio is calculated slightly di®erently than in the BIS ratio. The MOF ratio does not include short term subordinated debt as Tier 3 capital and latent capital gains are not included in Tier 2 capital. 6 Subordinated debt dated at more that 5 years counts toward Tier II capital. Recently, a third category of capital including short-term subordinated debt (between 2-5 years) has been added.
7 Until the introduction of mark-to-market accounting for investment account securities in¯scal year 2001, banks in Japan have been able to choose between the book value or fair value (the lower of book or market) method for recording the value of investment account equity holdings on thier balance sheets. Banks that chose the fair value method were able to count 45% of the unrealized gains on these equities toward Tier II capital. Prior to the Basel Accord, Japanese banks had been allowed to count up to 70% of these latent capital gains as capital under domestic law.
8 Land revaluations have only been included in Tier II captial since¯scal year 1998. 9 Table 1 does not include failed or nationalized banks, so the total number of banks falls in years in which there was a bank failure. See appendix A for a list of bank failures.
1988, when the Basel Accord was reached, and 1992, when the requirement became e®ective. After 1992, with the exception of one bank which was nationalized 10 , all \international" banks met the 8% requirement. Note however, that many banks switched from pursuing the 8% standard to the 4% standard. The number of banks aiming for 8% remained constant at around 85 for the¯rst half of the sample, but by 1997 the number had fallen to 44, and in the most recent¯scal year only 25 banks were still pursing the 8% BIS standard. Appendix A provides a list of the banks that switched from pursuing the 8% BIS ratio to the 4% MOF ratio in each year.
A bank needing to raise its capital ratio in order to meet the 8% requirement faces the following options. The BIS ratio can be boosted through capital, the numerator, by issuing subordinated debt, preferred stock or (only slightly) by increasing loan loss reserves. Alternatively, the denominator, risk-weighted assets, can be reduced by reducing heavily-weighted assets such as loans or equity holdings and substituting with unweighted, riskless assets such as government bonds. This paper investigates whether this incentive to shift away from heavily risk weighted assets in order to reduce risk weighted assets and boost capital to asset ratios may have resulted in a "capital crunch", reducing the supply of bank loans.
Literature Review
The question of how risk-based capital ratios e®ect bank portfolio decisions, especially lending, attracted the interest of researchers of the U.S. banking industry in the early 1990s and several studies con¯rm the capital crunch hypothesis that a reduction in loans was brought on by the BIS capital standards 11 .
Evidence on the existence of a credit crunch in Japan has been mixed. Peek and Rosengren (1997) ¯nd evidence that capital constraints brought on by the decline in the Japanese stock market was associated with a decrease in lending by Japanese banks in the United States. However, other studies looking at domestic lending in Japan have actually uncovered evidence of the reverse behavior: that relatively poorly capitalized banks tend to lend relatively more. For example, a study by Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) looking at the \top 20" Japanese banks 12 for the period 1990{ 1995¯nds a negative statistical relationship between capitalization and loan growth. The authors conclude that the recapitalization via subordinated debt issues produced a conservative lending attitude by banks. Work by Woo (1999) also¯nds evidence of a perverse statistical relationship between capitalization and loan growth for Japanese banks. Using aggregate loan quantities for 79 banks, Woo¯nds evidence of a credit crunch in 1997, but no evidence throughout most of the 1990s. In fact he¯nds evidence that until recently banks with weak capital positions tended to 10 Nippon Credit, which had never had overseas branches but had voluntarily aimed to meet the 8% capital adequacy standard, failed to meet the 8% standard in¯scal year 1996. In¯scal year 1997 Nippon Credit switched to the 4% benchmark. The bank was later nationalized in January of 1999.
11 See Peek and Rosengren (1995a) , Peek and Rosengren (1995b) , Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995) , Hall (1993) and Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) .
12 At that time there were actually 21 top banks: 11 city banks, 7 trust banks and 3 long-term credit banks.
extend loans at a faster rate than banks with strong capital positions. Ito and Sasaki (1998) ¯nd evidence of a capital crunch, but only for 14 of the 87 banks in their sample. In addition, the authors¯nd it necessary to exclude lending to the real estate, construction and¯nancial industries in their measure of loan growth in order to avoid¯nding the reverse statistical relationship 13 . This study improves upon previous research on this topic in several ways. First, a longer timeseries of data allows us to address the question of whether the observed statistical relationships are actually a response to the change in regulatory standards. A study of only the post-Basel period cannot really address the question of what e®ect the Accord had on bank lending. Even when evidence that capital adequacy ratios are signi¯cantly related to loan growth is uncovered, the question of whether or not this behavior is speci¯c to the post-Basel period remains. It is plausible that banks which are growing loans faster might consistently maintain a larger capital cushion and that the observed statistical relationship is not attributable to the Basel Accord constraints. Rather than simply estimating the statistical relationship between capitalization and loan growth for a sub-sample of years after the new capital requirements were agreed upon, this study analyzes at a long time span of data beginning before the Basel Accord was reached and looks for changes in bank behavior in response to the regulatory change.
Another advantage of the richer data set is that it allows for panel data analysis incorporating time¯xed e®ects. Many of the studies mentioned above rely upon cross-sectional analysis, which fails to account for macroeconomic or loan demand shocks in any given year. In this study, timē xed e®ects are included in the econometric speci¯cation in order to account fully for macroeconomic shocks in any given period that may a®ect loan growth for reasons other than the supply factors included in the model
The time series element of the data set is also exploited to use 2-stage least squares estimation with lagged instrumental variables, which ensures that the error term in the estimating equation is orthogonal to the dependent right-hand side variables.
Use of a longer time series of data means that is it not possible to use the actual BIS capital adequacy ratio in the empirical analysis. The BIS ratio has only been reported since the Basel Accord was signed in¯scal year 1988. As stated above, the intention of this study is to examine changes in bank behavior after introduction of the new capital adequacy standards, requiring a sample of data from the pre-Basel Accord regime. Thus, this study uses a constructed capital ratio of shareholders equity to loans, which is available for the pre-Basel Accord period as well. This capital ratio approximates the banks "core" or tier I capital ratio, which is primarily shareholders equity. Use of this constructed capital ratio has several advantages. Tier II capital for Japanese banks includes subordinated debt, which has often been purchased by the Japanese government in order to boost the capital positions of troubled banks. Thus, prudent behavior on the part of troubled banks, cutting back on highly risk weighted assets such as loans, could actually yield the opposite statistical relationship between loan growth and capitalization if researchers use the standard measure of total (Tier I and Tier II) capital in their empirical analysis. This point is discussed in more detail in section 5, which describes some of the other advantages of this measure of capital as well.
Another improvement in this study is the selection of banks to be included in the empirical analysis. As will be discussed further in section 5, domestic and international banks in Japan face di®erent capital constraints and di®erent incentives to meet those constraints. Not all of the "Top 20" largest banks are international banks pursuing an 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio, and there are several "regional" banks with overseas o±ces, engaged in international lending, that are constrained by the 8% BIS requirement. Since domestic banks are subject to lower capital adequacy requirements and more lenient regulation in meeting those standards, failure to carefully account for these di®erences could easily lead to the incorrect conclusion that the behavior of all Japanese banks is una®ected by capital ratios.
With this improved data set, including the constructed capital ratios, and having carefully classi¯ed the banks included in the sample being estimated, this study reveals that the relationship between capital ratios and bank credit in the post-Basel Accord period since 1988 is very di®erent for international and domestic banks.
Model of Representative Bank Behavior
This section presents a rational expectations model of bank behavior in which a representative bank maximizes the present discounted value of future pro¯ts. In this simpli¯ed model, the bank earns revenue on loans net of the costs of obtaining funds in the form of deposits. It is assumed that the bank views itself as a price taker, so interest rates earned on loans or paid on deposits are exogenously given at the prevailing market rate. The bank also earns a bene¯t for maintaining a high ratio of capital to assets relative to some target level. This bene¯t may depend upon the regulatory state. The banks' capital stock at time t is assumed to be exogenously given in each time period, so banks wishing to adjust their capital to asset ratio do so through loans. However, banks face adjustment costs on any changes to the rate of loan growth.
A Taylor series approximation of the capitalization term yields an intercept term and a slope term, implying that banks react to a regulatory change by adjusting the level of the target capital ratio and/or the sensitivity of loan growth to capitalization. Other operating costs are assumed proportional to total loans and are absorbed in the loan adjustment costs term.
Taking these revenues and costs into account, a representative bank chooses loans so as to maximize the expected present discounted value of its future stream of pro¯ts. This dynamic maximization yields an Euler equation for loan growth in terms of lagged loan growth, interest rates, capitalization and the regulatory state, which will later be empirically estimated.
Revenues
Let a simpli¯ed bank balance sheet in which loans are the only asset and deposits the only liability 14 , be represented by the following:
where L = Loans, D = Deposits, and K = Capital (Shareholders' Equity), and shareholders' equity is calculated according to the accounting identity L ¡ D = K. Capital, K, and the interest rates on loans, r L , and deposits, r D , are assumed to be exogenously given in each time period t. 15 The revenue of an individual bank at any given point in time is determined by the gross return on loans minus the amount paid for deposits.
or, substituting in the short run capital constraint:
Costs
There is some bene¯t, B t , to high capitalization (a high capital to loan ratio), which depends upon the (discrete) regulatory state µ:
This bene¯t may come in the form of decreased regulatory scrutiny, reputational bene¯ts for existing equity holders, or simply the bene¯t of being able to make decisions on loan supply independent of capital constraints once the required capital ratio is cleared.
14 This simpli¯cation incorporates the major elements of the aggregate bank balance sheet: loans, deposits and shareholders' equity. 15 The assumption that capital is exogenous is a short run simplifying assumption. Given the accounting identity, the assumption that capital is exogenously given in each time period amounts to an assumption that banks decide upon loans and then are able to obtain the necessary deposits to fund those loans at the prevailing market interest rate. Although there were fears of a°ight to postal savings from bank deposits in response to the failure of several small credit cooperatives in the early 1990s, in 1995 the government announced a complete deposit guarantee through March 2001. Regarding exogenous interest rates: although banks' may in fact hold market power, it is assumed that they view themselves as price takers, and o®er loans and deposits at prevailing market rates.
Although bank capital is assumed to be exogenously determined, banks can adjust the capital ratio, and therefore the costs or bene¯ts associated with it, by adjusting loan growth However, there are some adjustment costs A t associated with any change in loans 16 :
The source of these costs when banks are increasing the rate of loan growth may seem fairly intuitive: the costs of hiring new sta® or seeking out new borrowers. However, there may also be signi¯cant costs to cutting back on loans, the phenomenon that was observed in response to the Basel Accord capital adequacy standards. These are costs associated with altering the time structure of the banks' portfolio, the increased risk of default when loans are called in early, or the costs of damage to a long-term business relationship when existing lines of credit are closed (loans are not rolled over).
As presented here, h µ (¢) and f(¢) are general, non-speci¯ed concave and convex functions, respectively.
As stated above, the bank views the stock of capital, K t , and interest rates, r L t and r D t as exogenously given. Banks select loans at time t in order to maximize expected present discounted value ¼ t :
where 0 < b < 1 is the rate of discount. Maximization with respect to L t yields the Euler equation:
16 As shown in section 2, many Japanese banks were below the 4% or 8% requirement when the Basel Accord was reached in late 1987. However, banks were able to adjust their balance sheets gradually over the 5 year transition period between 1988 and 1993, and by 1993 almost all were above the required BIS ratio. The fact that the banks adjusted slowly over the transition period rather than suddenly cutting leverage ratios when the accord was implemented in 1993 suggests that there are costs of adjustment associated with changes in loan growth. Empirical support for this observation is given by Hancock and Wilcox (1995) , who report that while it takes banks only about a year to adjust securities in response to capital shocks, adjustments of most loan categories require two to three years.
If we let
the Euler equation can be represented in the following log-linearized form:
Note that the constant term,¯3 ;µ , and the coe±cient on capitalization,¯4 ;µ , may change depending upon the regulatory environment, µ.
Empirical Methodology and Data
The model presented in section 4 provides a framework for testing whether loan growth became more sensitive to capitalization after the Basel Accord of 1988. This section outlines the methodology and data used in empirically testing the implications of the model presented above.
Replacing conditional expectations in the log-linearized Euler equation 10 of section 4 with actual values yields an equation of the form:
" i;t+1 is a rational expectations error term, which is serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to information available at time t. The expectation conditional on time t information, I t , is E[" i;t+1 j I t ] = 0, suggesting that period t instruments are valid. However, to address concerns that the capital to asset ratio, Ki;t L i;t , may be correlated with the error term " i;t+1 , equation 11 is estimated by 2-stage least squares using lagged instrumental variables.
Since the model presented here only incorporates loan supply, there may be omitted variables, such as macroeconomic events or loan demand conditions, that a®ect loan growth in each time period. Two empirical speci¯cations are estimated to account for these omitted variables. In one speci¯cation, lagged GDP growth is included in the empirical speci¯cation as a "Z" variable 17 to account for macroeconomic conditions. However, since it is impossible to include an exhaustive list of "Z" variables that will adequately account for credit demand and macroeconomic conditions, an empirical speci¯cation including time¯xed e®ects is also estimated. The estimation results of both empirical speci¯cations are reported in section 6. In addition, the results of an estimation including individual¯xed e®ects in addition to time¯xed e®ects are reported in appendix B.
A panel of data from 131 Japanese banks' balance sheets and income statements for¯scal years 1982{1999 is used to estimate equation 11. As explained in section 2, international and domestic banks in Japan are held to di®erent standards. Under the Basel Accord, an international bank, de¯ned as any bank with an overseas branch o±ce, is subject to an 8% BIS ratio requirement. In Japan, domestic banks are only required to maintain a 4% MOF ratio requirement, but they may self-select to pursue the 8% BIS ratio requirement. Initially, several purely domestic banks that did not have an overseas o±ce and did not engage in international lending elected to report the BIS capital adequacy ratio and hold themselves to the 8% standard. However, all but two of these banks, Michinoku Bank and Iyo Bank, have since switched to pursuing the domestic 4% MOF ratio target. In addition, since 1988 several internationally active banks chose to close their international o±ces and switch from pursuing the 8% BIS ratio to the 4% MOF ratio. These regulatory di®erences likely a®ected how di®erent types of Japanese banks respond to changes in their regulatory capital ratio.
These potential di®erences are allowed for in the estimation by separating the sample into three sub-samples: domestic banks, international banks and "switcher" banks. The three sub-samples are comprised of 47 \domestic" banks that have been aiming for a 4% MOF ratio continuously throughout the post-Basel Accord period, 25 "international" banks that have been aiming for an 8% BIS ratio continuously throughout the post-Basel Accord period, and 59 "switcher" banks that originally reported a BIS ratio but switched sometime in the post-Basel Accord period to reporting a domestic MOF ratio. 21 banks are excluded from the analysis due to nationalization, failure, or because they were established mid-sample. Appendix A presents a detailed list of the banks included in each group.
Mergers are accounted for by treating the merged bank as one entity for the entire sample period. For example, Tokyo-Mitsubishi bank is treated as one bank throughout the sample period, with the balance sheets of Tokyo Bank and Mitsubishi Bank being combined even in the years before the merger took place.
Balance sheet data is reported at book value and on a unconsolidated basis. In¯scal year 1997 many large banks began reporting on a consolidated basis and all banks are now required to do so, but unconsolidated data is used in order to construct a continuous time series.
Loans are the sum of domestic loans to all industries plus international loans and trust account loans as reported in the annual yukashoken hokokusho reports.
The measure of capital used in the empirical analysis is meant to approximate the Basel de¯nition of Tier I capital. Since an exact measure of Tier I capital is not available prior to¯scal year 1988, the book value of each banks' net worth as reported in the annual yukashoken hokokusho is used. Tier I capital as de¯ned in the Basel Accord is adjusted for minority interest in consolidated subsidiaries, but mostly consists of shareholders equity, as would be reported in the yukashoken ¯ling.
There are several advantages to using this measure of capital rather than the actual BIS capital ratio. The¯rst is data availability. Actual BIS ratios and measures of Tier I and Tier II capital are only available from 1988 and it is of interest to know how bank behavior may have changed after the introduction of new regulations stemming from the Basel Accord rather than to simply look at the empirical relationship between loans and capital ratios after the Accord was signed.
Secondly, this measure of capital is advantageous because it does not include subordinated debt issues. In recent years, the Japanese government has made direct purchases of subordinated debt as way in recapitalizing the troubled banking sector. These capital injections, initiated in March of 1998, 1999 and 2000 amounted to over 8 trillion yen, or approximately 80 billion dollars. Even prior to these overt policy actions, the Ministry of Finance often arranged subordinated debt purchases for troubled banks. Non-bank¯nance companies or insurance companies a±liated with large banks were pressured by the Ministry of Finance to purchase subordinated debt issues in order to help troubled banks meet the 8% BIS ratio required under the Basel Accord. Thus, measures of capital including subordinated debt are likely to be negatively correlated with the banks "core" capital measure. As pointed out indirectly by Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) , the¯ndings of moral hazard behavior in previous studies of the relationship between bank capital and lending in Japan may be due to the fact that the measure of capital used in these studies includes Tier II capital, and therefore subordinated debt issues. Even if capital constrained banks in Japan react by cutting back on loans in order to boost BIS ratios, the fact that the government regularly intervenes by supplying Tier II capital to weak banks at the close of the¯scal year could yield the opposite statistical relationship if the measure of capital used includes subordinated debt issues.
In all the data series, log changes are used to approximate growth rates, as discussed in Section 4. GDP and the average interest rate on loans and deposits are aggregated up to annual averages from the monthly statistics reported by the research and statistics department of the Bank of Japan. Table 2 Here Table 2 reports the results of an estimation of equation 11, including lagged GDP growth as a "Z" variable to account for macroeconomic conditions. For all three bank groups -international, domestic and "switcher" -the parameter estimate on lagged loan growth is statistically signi¯cantly positive at the 5% level and less than 1 as would be expected. Parameter estimates for GDP loan growth and the interest rate spread are also positive, as would be expected for a loan supply equation, and statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. The parameter estimate on the capital to asset ratio is not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the pre-Basel period for international banks. For the domestic and switcher banks, the coe±cient on the capital to asset ratio in the pre-Basel period is actually negative, suggesting that less well capitalized banks may have grown loans relatively faster.
Empirical Results
Turning to the post-Basel period, the "Basel" dummy variable is negative and statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level for all the bank groups, indicating that banks of all types have reduced loan growth in the post-Basel period since FY 1988. Quantitatively, this coe±cient is largest for the international banks, followed by the "switcher" banks and domestic banks.
Finally, the parameters of most interest, the coe±cient estimates for capital to asset ratios in the post-Basel period, are positive and statistically signi¯cant for all three bank groups. This indicates that the sensitivity of lending to capital to asset ratios changed signi¯cantly for all three types of banks in the post-Basel period.
However, closer inspection of the coe±cient estimates reveals some important di®erences in the behavior of the three bank groups. For domestic and "switcher" banks, the positive coe±cient estimates on capital ratios in the post-Basel period are not very large relative to the negative coe±cient estimates on capital ratios in the pre-Basel period. This means that the net e®ect of capital ratios on loan growth may be negligible for banks in these groups.
For the "switcher" banks, a dummy term is included for the period after the switch year when each bank switched from pursuing the 8% BIS capital adequacy requirement to pursuing the domestic 4% MOF requirement. This switch year dummy is also interacted with the capital to asset ratio. Neither coe±cient estimate is statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, suggesting that the switch from pursuing the 8% BIS ratio to pursuing the 4% MOF ratio did not signi¯cantly a®ect the sensitivity of lending to capitalization for these banks. In this empirical speci¯cation the switcher banks do not appear to have acted very di®erently from domestic banks to begin with -as stated above lending by both domestic and switcher banks appears relatively insensitive to capitalization -so this is not surprising.
On the contrary, the coe±cient estimate on capital ratios in the post-Basel period for international banks is large, and the coe±cient estimate on pre-Basel capital ratios was not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero to start with.
Overall, we may conclude that although all bank groups were a®ected by the regulatory change, the net e®ect was much larger for international banks in Japan. This result is consistent with the observation that required capital ratios were higher for international banks than domestic banks in the post-Basel period 18 . In addition, capital requirements for international banks were likely more strictly enforced by regulatory authorities and international banks may have had stronger individual incentives to meet the requirement. Table 3 Here Table 3 presents the results of a speci¯cation including time¯xed e®ects 19 . The results reported in table 3 largely con¯rm the¯ndings above. Similar to the results reported in table 2, the parameter estimate on lagged loan growth is statistically signi¯cantly positive at the 5% level and less than 1 for all three bank groups. Once macroeconomic factors are accounted for using¯xed time e®ects, the coe±cient estimates for the capital to asset ratios are not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the pre-Basel period for any of the bank groups.
For domestic banks, the coe±cient estimates on capital to asset ratios in the post-Basel period are also not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, indicating that the change in regulatory regime did not a®ect the sensitivity of loan growth to capitalization for domestic banks.
Loan growth for the "switcher" banks is sensitive to capitalization, as demonstrated by the positive and statistically signi¯cant coe±cient estimate on capitalization in the post-Basel period for the "switcher" banks. However, as in the previous speci¯cation, the behavior of the "switcher" bank group does not seem to have changed once these banks switched from pursuing the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio to pursuing the domestic 4% MOF capital adequacy ratio. This is illustrated by the statistically insigni¯cant coe±cient estimate on the capitalization -"switch year" interaction term.
For international banks, the coe±cient estimate on capital to asset ratios in the post-Basel period are positive and statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. In addition, the coe±cient estimate on capitalization is quantitatively larger for the international banks, suggesting that the Basel Accord a®ected international banks pursuing an 8% BIS requirement more than eventual "switcher" banks pursuing the same goal. As reported above, the Accord appears not to have a®ected the lending behavior of domestic banks pursuing the 4% MOF ratio much at all.
Overall, the results of both empirical speci¯cations indicate that lending in the post-Basel period is signi¯cantly linked to capitalization for international banks, but not for domestic banks. The positive parameter estimates on capital ratios in the post-Basel period for international banks indicate that relatively well capitalized banks tended to grow loans relatively quickly (or that less well capitalized banks tended to grow loans relatively slowly). Although there is evidence of a shift in behavior in the post-Basel period for "switcher" banks that originally opted to pursue the 8% BIS capital requirement as well, the shift seems to have been largest for international banks. The parameter estimate on capitalization in the post-Basel period is larger for the international banks that for the "switcher" banks, indicating that the e®ects of the regulatory change were bigger for the international banks. However, the coe±cient estimate on capitalization in the post-Basel period is still quantitatively as well as statistically signi¯cant for both international and "switcher" bank groups. Capital ratios for Japanese banks varied between 2% to 11% over the sample period, so a parameter estimate of around 1 (0.8), as estimated for the international (switcher) bank group, indicates that capitalization has an economically signi¯cant e®ect on loan growth of these banks in the post-Basel period. On the contrary, coe±cient estimates on capitalization for the domestic banks are found to be either statistically or quantitatively insigni¯cant in both empirical speci¯cations.
Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that the response to stricter capital adequacy ratios introduced under the Basel Accord of 1988 was di®erent for international and domestic banks in Japan.
This study¯rst provides an analytic framework for addressing this question that is consistent with observed behavior of Japanese banks. A rational expectations model of pro¯t maximization incorporating adjustment costs to changes in loan growth provides a theoretical framework for empirically estimating the e®ect of regulatory changes brought on by the Basel Accord on bank lending. One empirical¯nding, that international bank lending is sensitive to capitalization, is consistent with previous studies on U.S. banks. These studies generally¯nd that U.S. banks reduced loans in order to boost capital positions after stricter capital adequacy requirements were introduced under the Basel Accord. However the evidence presented on international banks in this study marks a departure from previous research on Japanese banks, which has generally failed tō nd evidence that loan growth is sensitive to capitalization. This is the¯rst study to explore the possibility of di®erential reactions to the regulation by domestic and international banks, and the¯ndings of previous researchers may have been partially driven by the fact that analysis was conducted on a cross-section including both international and domestic banks. Other improvements in the analysis presented here include the long time-series of data under analysis and the measure of capital. Some of the existing studies examine only a subsample of data after adjustment to the new regulation had already taken place. The use of a longer time series of data including individual bank data from before and after the Basel Accord allows for a test for a change in the relationship between capitalization and bank credit after the regulatory change. In addition, the use of time series data allows for the estimation of a¯xed time e®ects model, accounting for macroeconomic conditions that may have a®ected bank lending behavior, and the use of 2-stage least squares estimation using lagged instrumental variables, addressing concerns of endogeneity between capital ratios and shocks to loan growth. Finally, the measure of capitalization used in this study approximates the banks' "core" capital and does not include subordinated debt. Subordinated debt has been used as a means of providing \capital injections" to troubled banks, which may explain the¯nding in some earlier studies of a negative relationship between loan growth and capitalization for Japanese banks.
With the improvements identi¯ed above, convincing evidence is found that internationally active banks in Japan behaved similarly to banks in the United States in responding to the new capital requirements introduced under the Basel Accord of 1988. For international banks in Japan, the sensitivity of loan growth to capitalization has increased in response to stricter capital adequacy requirements introduced under the Basel Accord of 1988. A similar¯nding is reported for a groups of "switcher" banks that initially pursued the same 8% capital adequacy requirement as international banks, but then later switched to pursuing a domestic 4% MOF ratio. However, for domestic banks, which were consistently pursuing the 4% MOF capital adequacy ratio in the post-Basel period, there is no evidence of a shift in the sensitivity of lending to capitalization. These¯ndings are consistent with the fact that the domestic MOF capital adequacy requirement is less stringent than the international BIS capital adequacy requirement, therefore requiring less of a behavioral shift on the part of banks. In addition, the requirement for domestic banks is likely less rigorously enforced, as evidenced by di®erential timing of inspections and application of prompt corrective action legislation. Asahi (8) Joyo (2) Shiga (1) Chiba (3) Juroku (1) Shizuoka (3) Chugoku (2) Michinoku (0) Sumitomo (17) Daiichi Kangyo (17) Mitsubishi Trust (5) Sumitomo Trust (5) Fuji (17) Nishi-Nippon (2) Tokai (12) Gunma (1) Ogaki Kyoritsu (2) Tokyo Mitsubishi (44) Hachijuni (1) Sakura (16) Yamaguchi (4) Industrial Bank of Japan (15) San-in Godo (1) Iyo (0) Sanwa (17) Table 4 provides a list of international banks included in the empirical analysis of section 6. An international banks is de¯ned as a bank that reports the BIS capital adequacy ratio and has held to the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio for the entire sample period under analysis: FY1982-FY1999. The number in parenthesis in table 4 indicates the number of international branches as of September 2000. International representative o±ces are not included in this total. Michinoku Bank and Iyo Bank have no branches outside Japan but have elected to report the BIS international capital adequacy ratio and pursue the 8% standard. Most of the \international" group¯le both consolidated and unconsolidated balance sheets. Exceptions are Iyo Bank, Michinoku Bank and Shiga Bank, which only¯le unconsolidated balance sheets. Table 5 provides a list of domestic banks used in the empirical analysis of section 6. Domestic banks are de¯ned as banks that report the MOF capital to asset ratio and are required to maintain a 4% MOF capital adequacy ratio. These banks by de¯nition do not have o±ces outside of Japan. Most of the domestic banks only¯le unconsolidated balance sheets. The exception is Ibaraki Bank, which¯les both an unconsolidated and a consolidated balance sheet. Table 6 provides a list of "switcher" banks, banks that¯rst reported a BIS capital to asset ratio and were held to the 8% BIS capital adequacy ratio, and then switched sometime during the sample period to report the domestic MOF capital to asset ratio and be held to the MOF 4% capital adequacy ratio. These switcher banks are organized by the year in which they switched from pursuing the BIS 8% capital adequacy standard to pursuing the MOF 4% capital adequacy standard. An asterisk marks those banks that had international o±ces (that were subsequently closed) in the year prior to switching to the domestic MOF standard. Table 7 lists those banks excluded from the analysis reported in section 6. The following banks are excluded from the analysis because they were closed or nationalized during the sample period between FY1982-FY1999. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed on October 17, 1997. The Nippon Credit Bank 20 was nationalized on December 13, 1998 and in January 2001 reopened as Aozora Bank. The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan was nationalized on October 23, 1998 and reopened on June 5, 2000 as Shinsei Bank. Namihaya Bank, which was formed on October 1, 1998 from the merger of Bank of Naniwa and Fukutoku Bank, was closed on August 6, 1999. 21 Hanwa Bank failed in November 1996. Kofuku Bank , which absorbed Kyoto Kyoei Bank on October 26, 1998 , closed on May 21, 1999 . Kokumin Bank 22 failed on April 11, 1999, and was absorbed by Yachiyo Bank 23 on August 14, 2000. Minato Bank 24 was established toward the end of the sample on September 1, 1999. Niigata-Chuo Bank 25 failed in October 1999. Tokuyo City Bank failed on November 26, 1997 , and was absorbed by Sendai Bank 26 on November 24, 1998. Tokyo Sowa Bank, established in 1950 as a \sogo" bank 27 , was closed on June 11, 1999. In addition, Hokuto Bank is excluded because it was established mid-sample in 1993. The Bank was¯rst established in 1895 as Masuda Bank and changed its name to Hokuto Bank after absorbing Akita Akebono Bank on April 1, 1993.
Appendices A Bank Groups
Other Data Adjustments Data for Asahi Bank 28 , which was formed by the merger of Kyowa Bank and Saitama Bank on April 1, 1991, is backdated by combining data from the two bank balance sheets. The same technique is used to backdate data for Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, which was formed by the merger of Bank of Tokyo Bank and Mistubishi Bank on April 1, 1996 and for Sakura Bank, which was established on April 1990 through the merger of Mitsui Bank Ltd. and Taiyo Kobe Bank Ltd. In order to include Sendai Bank in the sample, the last¯scal year of data is not used.
Several other banks in the sample -Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Joyo Bank, Minami-Nippon Bank and Tokai Bank were also formed as the result of mergers, although they occurred before the sample period so no data adjustment was necessary. Dai-Ichi Kangyo was established on October 1, 1971 (pre-sample) through the merger of the Dai-Ichi Bank Ltd. and The Nippon Kangyo Bank Ltd. Joyo Bank Ltd. was established on July 30, 1935 following merger of Tokiwa Bank and Goyu Bank. Tokai Bank was established in 1941 as the result of the merger between Aichi Bank, Nagoya Bank and Ito Bank. Minami-Nippon Bank, a domestic bank, was established in 1943 through the merger of 2 local banking institutes in Kagoshima prefecture.
Recent Li;t¡1 ¢ Switch Y R 0:230 (0:164) * Indicates signi¯cance at 5% level.
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